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Abstract—Personal devices (e.g. laptops, tablets, and mobile
phones) are conventional in daily life and have the ability to
store users’ private data. The security problems related to these
appliances have become a primary concern for both users and
researchers. In this paper, we analyse first-person-view videos
to develop a personalized user authentication mechanism. Our
proposed algorithm generates provisional image-based passwords
which benefit a variety of purposes such as unlocking a mobile
device or fallback authentication. First, representative frames
are extracted from the egocentric videos. Then, they are split
into distinguishable segments before a clustering procedure is
applied to discard repetitive scenes. The whole process aims to
retain memorable images to form the authentication challenges.
We integrate eye tracking data to select informative sequences
of video frames and suggest a blurriness-based method if an
eye-facing camera is not available. To evaluate our system,
we perform experiments in different settings including object-
interaction activities and traveling contexts. Even though our
mechanism produces variable graphical passwords, the log-in
effort for the user is comparable with approaches based on
static challenges. We verified the authentication challenges in the
presence of a random and an informed attacker who is familiar
with the environment and observed that the time required and
the number of attempts are significantly higher than for the
legitimate user, making it possible to detect attacks on the
authentication system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Personal digital devices are involved in a multitude of
aspects of our daily life such as working, entertainment, finan-
cial management, navigation, and healthcare. Consequently,
laptops, tablets, and smartphones are versatile appliances that
store and operate on private data. As a protection mechanism,
they are usually accessible with secret information known only
by the permissible users. Thus, typical users may have to
register and remember at least one password for each device,
which is generally related to their personal preferences. How-
ever, the compact size of many of these devices contradicts
the deployment of traditional authentication methods.
Graphical passwords, such as the 9-dot log-in screen on
the Android platform, have been gaining more popularity than
classical text-based approach due to their convenience on the
touch-based interface. Nevertheless, the user is required to
remember a static password which is vulnerable to shoulder
surfing attacks [1]. Moreover, it is possible to reconstruct
the secret pattern from images of the smartphone screen [2].
Changing the pattern frequently and multi-factor authentica-
tion are countermeasures for this attack strategy but they im-
pose more burdens on the users. Although biometric security
mechanisms are increasingly applied for authentication on
mobile devices [3], they are naturally limited and difficult to
substitute in case of being lost or compromised [4].
Wearable cameras allow users to continuously capture
videos or images of the environment from the first-person
perspective. They can be mounted to a frame of eyeglasses [5],
clipped on a shirt 1, or even attached to a wristband [6].
Modern wearable cameras are equipped with other sensors
(e.g. accelerometer and gyroscope) and wireless communi-
cation capability (e.g. wifi or bluetooth). The characteristics
of egocentric videos make them a potential candidate for
designing authentication schemes on personal devices. We
propose to generate always-fresh, temporal and personalized
authentication challenges from images captured by a wearable
camera. A set of photos are displayed on the screen and
the legitimate user exploits her implicit knowledge on their
temporal order to log-in. Our main contributions include:
1) the first-ever egocentric video-based authentication sys-
tem with always-fresh authentication challenges. The
system features eye-fixation and blurriness-based image
filters and thereby flexibly supports different camera
systems
2) the instrumentation and evaluation of two distinct au-
thentication challenge formats in touch-based user in-
terfaces supporting slide-and-swipe gestures: image-
arrangement and image-selection, which achieve the
mean entry time of 9.77 seconds and 3.10 seconds,
respectively. The measurement is comparable with other
memory-based schemes [7] [8] [9] while our mechanism
produces dynamic graphical passwords (i.e. resistance
against shoulder-surfing and smudge attacks)
3) a method to analyse diverse egocentric videos containing
object-interaction scenarios and outdoor scenes. One of
our experiment settings spanned three weeks in different
European cities
4) a threat model and an attacking case study with in-
formed, active and random attackers to prove that the
adversaries must spend significantly higher effort than
the legitimate users on solving the passwords
1Transcend DriveProTM Body 10 wearable camera: https://www.transcend-
info.com/Products/No-704
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Our proposed authentication scheme is inspired by the im-
plicit memory concept, in which previous experiences support
the performance of a task without conscious or intentional
re-collection of those experiences [10]. One popular practice
to investigate implicit memory is the priming procedure. The
investigator first gives the participant a set of stimuli (e.g.
words, objects, or audio) and then observes the effects in
later experiments. In this paper, the stimuli are video frames
recorded by a wearable camera from the first-person perspec-
tive. The images are combined to form the authentication
challenge and the user is required to, for instance, (a) rearrange
them in the chronological order, or (b) mark images that
occurred in a specified time window (e.g. mark the image(s)
that did occur yesterday). If our system is equipped with an
eye-facing camera, fixations are utilized to detect the user’s
attention, which further increases the memorability of the
chosen image for the user. Otherwise, we leveraged an image
blurriness feature to filter non-informative video frames. We
employ image segmentation and clustering to select highly
memorable images and discard repetitive scenes. Two authen-
tication formats are implemented and assessed in different
scenarios. The first asks a user to arrange images into their
correct timeline while the second requires the users to pick
which events have not happened in a certain period of time.
Both formats are graphical passwords and compatible with
touch-based interfaces. Since the authentication challenges are
formed from what the users encounter during daily activi-
ties, the registration phase is implicit and the passwords are
changing over time. Figure 1 illustrates a situation in which
the user recalls the chronological order of four images for
authentication on a tablet.
In our image-based authentication mechanism, a wearable
camera acts as the password generator or security token
without explicitly showing authentication codes. It empowers
user authentication not only on mobile devices (e.g tablets
and smartphones) but also on desktop computers, which do
not have sensors for such implicit authentication as gait-based
method. Figure 2 depicts an authentication procedure that
leverages our proposed mechanism. After the camera device
has authenticated the user and paired with the personal device,
images are continuously extracted from first person video. The
image-based authentication challenge is initialized by any log-
in request on the personal device.
In the rest of the paper, we first review related work
about recent user authentication schemes and egocentric video
summarization methods. Then, we explain the process of
selecting images from first-person-view videos to form the
authentication challenges, as well as the techniques to remove
non-informative and repetitive scenes. Finally, our user study
results and attacking models are discussed before the paper is
concluded.
II. RELATED WORK
Pattern-based passwords on touch screens have been com-
fortably adopted for a long time but they can be compromised,
for example, by a camera-based smudge attack [2]. Thus,
Fig. 1. The proposed concept: image-based authentication challenges gener-
ated from egocentric videos
several user authentication approaches have been proposed
as alternative solutions. Most of them exploited users’ be-
haviorial data recorded by wearable sensors such as ac-
celerometer [12] [19] or camera [20]. A couple of innovative
authentication forms were built on implicit memory of past
information, such as events [21] [22], images [18] [9], and
installed applications [7].
The unique characteristics of human movements can serve
as an information source for user identification. Sitova´ et
al. [19] introduced a behavior-based authentication mechanism
on smartphones. They record subtle prehensile movements
performed by the user when grasping, holding, and tapping
to interact with objects. Specifically, their proposed features
are extracted from information captured by accelerometer,
gyroscope, and magnetometer during or close to tap events.
The authentication process was implemented and evaluated
with scaled Manhattan distance, scaled Euclidean distance,
and a single-class Support Vector Machine classifier. Another
behaviroral feature is how human eyes react to stimuli. Using
the built-in front camera on a smartphone, Song et al. [20] in-
troduced a novel smartphone authentication mechanism based
on eye movements. They track human eye movement and
extract gaze patterns when the user is exposed to visual stimuli
on the phone screen.
The release of smartglasses such as JINS MEME [23] or
Google Glass has introduced new opportunities and challenges
in user authentication. Li et al. [12] takes advantage of head
motions when the user wears smartglasses to recognize the
wearer. We usually move our heads in specific patterns when
listening to music. Thus, the authors analysed these distinct
movements to identify the wearers.
On the other hand, a pair of smart-glasses equipped with
a near-eye screen is able to extend the interface of other
Camera device
•
•
•
•
•
Personal device
◦
Login request
◦
◦
◦•
•
•
User-to-camera authentication (e.g. [11]–[13])
Continuously:
Extract images from egocentric video
while enforcing user privacy (e.g. [14]–[18])
Device pairing
Display the authentication challenge
Login request
Generate the authentication challenges
Send the image-based passwords
User’s answer to the authentica
tion challenge
Verification
Login result
User-to-camera authentication: The personalized camera
device capturing the first person video is a central component
in our distributed authentication scheme. We assume that
the camera device is at all time strictly associated with the
identity of its wearer. To verify identiy of a user from an
on-body camera is, for instance, possible using video-based
motion analysis [11]. If an eye tracking camera is available
on the headset, user identification based on ocular biometric
traits (iris, retina, and eye movement) is possible [13]. Also,
some smart-glasses are equipped with accelerometers and
gyroscopes to facilitate continuous user authentication [12].
Enforcing user privacy on egocentric videos: Another impor-
tant issue of first-person-view cameras is that they may capture
sensitive visual data. Recent work has tackled this problem by
detecting private locations [14] and screens [15]. Recorded
video frames can also be transformed to cartoon images [16]
before they are displayed. In this case, a legitimate user is still
able to recognize the cartoon images if the original ones have
been seen before [18]. Furthermore, Wang et al. [17] proposed
an outsourcing scheme to protect private images processed on
untrusted cloud servers.
Fig. 2. The protocol for communication during the login procedure include an initial user authentication at the camera device and pairing to the personal
equipment. Then, the graphical authentication challenge can be requested and autenticated using the camera device as a verifier for the identity of the wearer.
devices. Winkler et al. [24] suggested to employ a numpad
layout displayed only on a private near-eye display during
the authentication phase. This approach is a countermeasure
against smudge attacks, shoulder-surfing, and camera attacks
because the user inputs the password on an almost empty
phone interface. Our proposed approach provides this feature
because it shows a new challenge for each log-in attempt.
Implicit memory on images has been used to facilitate
user authentication instead of classical character-based pass-
words. Dhamija and Perrig [9] proposed a novel authentication
scheme that relied on the human ability of image recognition.
A user first chooses a portfolio of images from a collection
presented by a server. Then, to be authenticated, the user must
distinguish all selected images with decoy ones. Everitt et
al. [8] studied graphical passwords composed of nine facial
images each and the users were authenticated by picking
correct faces from distracters. Denning et al. [18] exposed
a user to the complete version of images first and then to their
degraded counterparts as the authentication challenge. Our
proposed approach does not require such priming procedure
because the user implicitly perceives the scenes, which are
captured simultaneously by the wearable camera. Beyond
photos displayed by an external system, Hang et al. [22]
proposed to generate the questions for fallback authentication
from what users have done with their smartphones. The infor-
mation directly comes from the data inside the smartphone.
For example, they asked the user which photo was taken or
with whom was communicated in the past. Indeed, before that,
Das et al. [21] had proved the effectiveness of autobiographical
authentication through two online questionnaires and one field
study. Applications installed on mobile devices offer a key
space for automatic password generation [7]. Each graphical
authentication challenge contains icons of installed apps and
decoy apps (collected from the app market). Whenever the
users want to log-in, they make use of memory to recognize the
valid icons. While these approaches [21] [22] [7] rely on data
stored on the mobile devices, ours exploits visual information
recorded by a wearable camera during a user’s daily life.
Recently, the proliferation of wearable cameras has opened
up an emerging research trend: the analysis of egocentric
videos [25], in which computer vision and image processing
techniques have been utilized to analyse the first-person-view
visual data. The optical flow extracted from these videos
depicts the movements of human head and body, from which
the user’s activities can be inferred [26]. Those movements
are distinctive enough to facilitate wearer identification [11].
To cope with the vast amount of these images and videos,
summarization algorithms are leveraged to retain meaningful
and memorable excerpts [27] [28]. The outcomes are context-
dependent multimedia contents that are individualized to a
certain user. Technically speaking, our work is similar to video
summarization [27] [28] or snap point detection [29] in terms
of extracting important parts of the egocentric videos. In a
seminal work, Lu et al. [27] relied on objects and people
that the user interacts with to compute an importance metric.
Then, they leveraged a story-driven approach to organize the
summary of egocentric videos. For important metric computa-
tion, it is possible to use a regressor operating on the distance
between objects and hands, distance between objects and the
center of the frame (as an estimation of the gaze), etc. The
story-driven approach was also utilized by Xiong et al. [30]
to extract a storyline representation for first-person videos.
Their system even supports story-based queries based on
four elements including actors, locations, objects, and events.
Using a Markov Random Field, they model the hierarchical
dependency between those aforementioned elements. Because
gaze is a natural measurement of how much the user is
attracted to a video subshot, it is used by Xu et al. [28]
in egocentric video summarization. The authors relied on
gaze information to segment videos before merging them into
subshots. Region-based Convolutional Neural Networks were
used to extract the feature vector in the central frame of
each subshot. Another approach is based on photos captured
intentionally and uploaded online to select important frames
in egocentric videos [29].
Visual context recognition is a further area closely related to
our research. Furnari et al. [31] analysed egocentric videos to
facilitate the recognition of personal contexts. They recorded
the videos with different camera models in various locations.
Each image is represented with a holistic descriptor (or the
“gist” of the scene), local features (Scale-invariant feature
transform or SIFT) encoded by Improved Fisher Vectors, and
values from the penultimate layer of Convolutional Neural
Networks. Castro et al. [32] combined Convolutional Neural
Networks and Random Decision Forests to identify human
activities from egocentric images. Even though our work
focuses on personal surroundings, we do not define a fixed set
of contexts to be identified. In particular, our image selection
method, which relies on segmentation and clustering, aims
to group video frames based on their visual characteristics
without prior knowledge on the contexts and contents.
The fundamental components of our authentication scheme
is built on image analysis techniques. We first extract the
visual descriptors from each frame of the egocentric videos
and then select representative frames that the user can easily
memorize. In order to do that, the selected images should
contain particular and salient details which help the user to
remember their order of appearance.
III. IMAGE-BASED PASSWORD GENERATION
In this section, we discuss the technical details behind our
graphical password generation process. First, several represen-
tations of authentication challenges are recommended, along
with their use cases. Second, we present our algorithm to
select candidate video frames which are later used to create
image-based authentication challenges. The general idea is
that the content in those frames triggers the user’s implicit
memory [10]. Finally, we describe the features extracted from
the frames of egocentric videos.
A. Graphical Password Design
Our framework described in Section III takes egocentric
videos and exports images, which are split into different
contexts along the timeline. These contexts are related to the
wearer’s activities or locations. We suggest four authentication
schemes where the output images can be employed as shown
in Figure 3 (A sequence of challenges may appear consecu-
tively to harden the challenge):
• Temporal positioning (Figure 3a): We leverage the mo-
ment when the images are captured to produce such
Yes/No questions as “Did you do that ...?”.
Fig. 3. Proposed screen layouts of our authentication mechanism
• Image selection (Figure 3b): The user has to select which
events (scenes) have not been done (or has been done
yesterday, or similar).
• Binary arrangement (Figure 3c): The system introduces
two images and the user slides to determine the right
chronological order.
• Multi-image arrangement (Figure 3d): Multiple images
are shown on the screen randomly and a user arranges
them in the right temporal order. Our implementation
changes the images whenever a wrong answer is sub-
mitted, which makes guessing attacks more challenging.
The aforesaid options are suitable for various types of authenti-
cation purposes. The first three schemes can be used as instant
log-in (one challenge only, depending on the user settings).
The last one may require longer duration of consideration,
which makes it appropriate for fall-back authentication. In
our experiments, the image-arrangement and image-selection
authentication scheme are implemented and evaluated (others
can be extended from these).
B. Selecting Representative Frames
We propose to choose candidate images for forming the
authentication challenges based on two criteria:
• Memorability: The image must be as easy to remember
for the wearer as possible.
• Popularity: The image should not be so common that it
can be easily recognized by the adversary. This can be
considered as the uniqueness measure of an image frame.
We aim to select frames that contain clear information (i.e.
there are details that can help the user to infer the chrono-
logical order). Figure 4 details the procedure, which consists
Fig. 4. The process of genarating authentication challenges from first-person-
view videos
Fig. 5. Non-informative images discarded from small clusters
of several image analysis techniques, including: key frame
selection, video segmentation, and scene clustering. After
these processing steps, we form the authentication challenges
of two formats: image-arrangement and image-selection.
Key Frame Selection: To reduce the number of images
extracted directly from the recorded videos, we retain only key
frames. In order to do that, there are two options: (i) selecting
frames whenever a fixation appears and (ii) retaining images
at every specific moment (e.g. five images per second). The
first approach requires data from the eye tracker device, which
may not be universally available in all wearable cameras. The
second requires a filtering method and more computational
demand. Eye fixations provide essential information of the
wearer’s visual behavior and have proven useful in video
summarization [28] because they reveal the user’s attention.
For example, there is a higher probability that an image
is important and memorable if the wearer’s eyes focuses
while the image is captured. For the second solution, we aim
to remove unclear video frames caused by body and head
movements. To do that, we calculate the blur information of
each frame with the method of Crete et al. [33]. Formally,
suppose the video consists of k frames vi whose the blurriness
is ni, we select vi if ni > median({ni|i ∈ N, 1 6 i 6 k}).
We observed that image sequences produced by two methods
were similar and equally useful.
Segmentation: After the first phase of extracting key
frames, the k′ 6 k selected images are then segmented
into scenes, based on similarity of visual features, which
are described in Section III-C. That means if the difference
between two frames is below a certain threshold, they be-
long to the same segments. In this paper, we define the
threshold as the median value of the Euclidean distance
between two consecutive (representative) frames in the feature
space. Suppose f is the function that extracts the feature
vector from each video frame, we define the threshold as
median({d(f(vi), f(vi+1))|i ∈ N, 1 6 i 6 (k′ − 1)}) where
d is the Euclidean distance function. We choose this threshold
instead of the pairwise distances between every pair of frames
for its lower computational complexity (O(n) instead of
O(n2)). The preliminary analysis of our experiments proved
that it produced better segmentation results. This parameter, as
well as the aforementioned blurriness limit, is adapted to the
personalized videos. We experimented with cosine similarity
but it did not improve the result in our case. In addition,
the user is able to specify the timeline in which videos are
analysed to form the authentication challenges. Thus, even
within a specific user’s clip collection, the values of these
thresholds depends only on the videos themselves.
Clustering: The next step is to cluster similar segments
into groups of similar scenes. The number of clusters is not
determined beforehand because there is no knowledge on
which activities are repetitive. To fulfil this requirement, we
use Density-based spatial clustering of applications with noise
(DBSCAN) [34], which groups together points that are in
a neighborhood. The algorithm requires two parameters: the
distance threshold to group similar images and the minimum
number of images in each cluster. The similarity threshold
of images is determined by analysing the difference of con-
secutive frames. We use the same threshold value for both
segmentation and clustering. The second parameter allows us
to discard noise images, which pop up abruptly and are non-
informative. Some example video frames that are removed by
this method are shown in Figure 5. They are blurred, dark or
do not contain interesting objects (almost empty).
Grouping & Challenge Generation: The challenge is
generated from the respective clusters as depticed in figure 7.
We have considered two distinct authentication challenge
formats as detailed in figure 6. To generate an image-selection
authentication challenge, scenes occurring in both days are
eliminated while repetitive activities in the same day still
appear in the final password. The lower part of the figure
sketches one image-arrangement password for each day, in
which similar images belonging to different segments are
grouped into the same cluster. Such photos are not selected
to form the authentication challenge. Note that the selected
images belong to different contexts (e.g. on bus, at the train
station, hiking, playing volleyball, having dinner, etc). When
generating the graphical passwords, we select one represen-
tative frame from one scene (i.e. segment) to guarantee the
distinguishability of the images.
C. Image Features
We aim to extract both global and local characteristics of
each video frame. The feature vector must therefore be able to
describe the appearance of the whole scene as well as the local
sub-regions and individual objects. To fulfil this requirement,
Image-arrangement
Image-arrangement passwords require users to recall the relative
timeline order of images. Thus, the input data is treated as a
continuous sequence of videos. After clustering, we group video
frames in such a way that images in the same segment belong to
the same cluster. Then, frames which are in the same cluster but
appear in different segments (i.e. repetitive scenes) are removed
from the candidate image set. This ensures that there is no pair
of images describing the same action but is interleaved in time
domain by images belonging do a different action, since this can
cause confusion for the user to guess the occurrence order. Thus,
our algorithm reduces the popularity of repetitive scenes while
strengthening the memorability.
Image-selection
Image-selection passwords insist on the moment when the user
executes a certain activity or observes a particular scene. In this
paper, the authentication question “What have you not done
today?” is showed above the images. Hence, we supply the
clustering algorithm with videos from two consecutive days. The
results are processed in such a way that scenes appear in both
days are discarded. Note that in this case we do not remove
repetitive segments happening in the same day because they do
not influence the user’s selection. This type of passwords can be
extended to other temporal scales. For example, the question
“What have you not done after 11:00am?” separates events
based on the recording time.
Fig. 6. Details on two authentication challenge formats
Fig. 7. Using image segmentation and clustering to remove repetitive scenes and form the authentication challenges
Fig. 8. Features extracted from a video frame (We only show excerpts of the
histogram-based image descriptors for better visulization)
we combine Census Transform Histogram (CENTRIST) and
the Pyramid of histograms of Orientation Gradients (PHOG)
to form the representation of our first-person-view images. We
perform Principle Component Analysis to reduce the number
of dimensions. In the experiments, we achieved the best result
when each feature vector contains n = 100 variables. The
final feature vectors are then used to split the video frames
into temporal sequences and cluster images that have similar
content. Figure 8 shows an example image, its intermediate
representations, and excerpts of its visual descriptors.
CENTRIST: [35] generates a holistic representation of a
scene by capturing the structural characteristics and the rough
geometry. Census transform compares the intensity value of
each pixel with those of its neighborhood. If the value is
less than one of its neighbors, the corresponding location is
assigned a bit 0, otherwise, a bit 1 is used. Then, eight bits in
the neighborhood are concatenated and converted to a base-
10 number called census transform value for the central pixel.
After all pixels of the image are evaluated, the CENTRIST
descriptor is constructed from a histogram of census transform
values. A spatial pyramid scheme is applied to obtain a
robust global representation. An image is split into (sliding)
blocks in different levels. In each block, the CENTRIST
descriptor is extracted independently. Finally, all descriptors
(i.e. histograms) of all blocks at all levels are aggregated to
form the representation of the whole image.
Fig. 9. Sample images extracted from our egocentric videos. They vary in activities (e.g. holding objects, playing sport, traveling on public transport, and
social interaction), locations (indoor and outdoor), weather conditions (e.g. winter and summer), and the light intensity (e.g. sunny day, having dinner at night,
and dark scene).
(a) Head-mounted camera (b) Chest-mounted camera
Fig. 10. The devices used to collect video data
PHOG: To complement the above global descriptors, we
compute the PHOG feature [36]. With this descriptor, Bosch et
al. [36] aimed to represent an image through its local shape
and the spatial relations of the shape. They divide an image
into rectangular regions at several resolutions and calculate the
distribution (histogram) of edge orientations in each region.
Each bin of the histogram contains the number of edges whose
orientations belong to a specified angular range. Then, the
concatenation of histograms from all regions becomes the
descriptor of the image.
IV. USER STUDY AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we present our case studies to verify the fea-
sibility of the approach. The videos were collected by wearable
cameras, then transmitted to a computer for frame extraction
and password generation. After that, the wearer solved the
passwords on other devices while the number of attempts and
the entry time were collected for further analysis. We assume
that all involved components (e.g. wearable cameras, personal
devices, processing servers, etc) are securely connected or
paired in advance, using wired or wireless communications.
We performed experiments in three scenarios under various
conditions:
• a pilot study with two wearable cameras to familiarize
the users (see Figure 10 for the mounting positions)
• an object-interaction setting in an office
• a daily condition study in which subjects wore the camera
during several days
Some images extracted from our video clips are shown in
Figure 9. Those photos contain diverse details due to the
subjects’ activities, body movements, locations, weather, light
intensity, and scene appearance.
A. Pilot Study
This study aims to introduce our authentication concept
and verify its feasibility. The image-arrangement scheme is
leveraged in these experimental sessions.
We employed the headset produced by Pupil Labs [5] to
acquire the world and eye videos. This device comprises two
cameras on a frame: the world camera to capture the scene
from the user’s point-of-view and the eye camera to record
videos of one user’s eye. Along with the hardware, a software
package is provided with such functions as: camera control,
eye tracking and fixation detection, visualization, etc. We
attached a laptop to the headset through a USB connection in
order to store both video streams simultaneously since this is
currently not supported with the mobile app. Figure 10a shows
our device installation for the data collection phase. The video
resolution is reduced from 1280× 720 to 320× 180.
An application was developed with Matlab 2 in order to
display the authentication challenges. Each challenge, i.e.
graphical password, consists of four video frames which are
selected from distiguishable temporal segments (for example,
see Figure 7). The users clicks on each frame to form a
chronological sequence of images. Each image stems from one
temporal segment and contains visually-diverse information.
Due to the clustering procedure, we do not select repeti-
tive actions, which may cause confusion for the user when
selecting the right chronological order. In each challenge,
the user needs to answer n = 4 image-based authentication
challenges consecutively. All passwords are generated from
the same video source but the images are selected randomly
from different segments. The number of attempts and the entry
time are collected for each password.
We recruited five subjects (two females, two wearing
glasses) to participate in two sessions. The first one aimed
to make the users familiar with the system while the second
encouraged the users to discover the environment and perform
more activities. The duration of videos in the former is 3− 5
2Matlab: https://www.mathworks.com/
Application Matlab-based Web-based
Entry time (seconds) 19.07 (18.17) 9.79 (7.00)
Number of attempts 1.65 (1.09) 1.87 (1.37)
TABLE I
USER EFFORT ON THE MATLAB-BASED (MOUSE-CLICK INTERACTION)
AND WEB-BASED (SLIDE-AND-SWIPE INTERACTION) INTERFACE IN OUR
PILOT STUDY. THE NUMBERS IN BRACKETS ARE STANDARD DEVIATION.
minutes and 6− 12 minutes in the latter. The subjects in our
experiments wore the device and went to different locations.
We suggested possible places to visit but the subjects did not
need to follow any specific routine. After that, the system
asked them to organize four images into the right chrono-
logical order. The number of attempts and the entry time are
recorded for further analysis. Since the entry time includes
the unsuccessful log-in trials, we measure the time until a
subject solves a password successfully regardless the number
of attempts, which is equivalent to the total time concept
proposed by Everitt et al. [8]. We analysed the users’ effort in
the second session because the first one only introduced our
system to the subjects. The average number of attempts and
entry time were 1.65 times and 19.07 seconds, respectively.
Particularly, in our experiments, the fastest time that a user
solved an authentication challenge is 3.79 seconds. These
results indicate that our approach can be utilised to generate
the visual authentication challenges from egocentric videos.
Next, we aim to improve the usability because the Matlab-
based prototype only supports mouse-click interaction. Thus,
we developed a web application that supported slide-and-swipe
gestures with Javascript and HTML. To record the videos,
a Transcend DriveProTM Body 10 device was worn by each
subject in two consecutive days (cf. Figure 10b). The camera
has a rotational clip to attach on clothes or backpack straps.
Whenever possible, the camera wearer started to continuously
record videos with the consideration of technical, legal, and
social regulations. The videos contained visual data of the
subjects’ daily activities. The system generates a new authenti-
cation challenge whenever the user wants to log-in. It changes
the challenge (i.e. new images) if the user submits a wrong
arrangement. We conducted the same evaluation process and
achieved better results. Specifically, the mean entry time is
9.79 seconds and the mean number of attempts is 1.87. Table I
summarizes the user effort in the Matlab-based and web-based
interface for comparison. There is an observation that the web-
based interface allows more attempts but less time-consuming.
Due to more variation in the two-day video clips, the user
effort may be higher but the touch-based interface decreases
the entry time significantly. Thus, we customized this kind of
user interface for other experiments.
B. Object-interaction Scenario
We prepared a room for object-interaction activities. The
setting was challenging to our system because all activities
occurred at the same location. Thus, the object appearance
and interaction are the only visual cues that assist our video
analysis algorithm. The room in this experiment was a usual
workplace in which there are basic furniture and office equip-
ment. The room is new to all seven participants (four females,
two with glasses) in the experiment. Each subject was asked
to perform at least five activities (possible activities were
suggested but the subjects were free to perform also others
and on the order), then solve passwords generated from the
recorded egocentric videos. The suggested activities include:
reading a book, working on a laptop, writing on paper, writing
on a board, viewing a poster, talking to a person, using a
smartphone, unboxing an item, playing a board game, and
using a paper-cutter. The objects are put on the desks (laptop,
paper, gameboard, and paper-cutter), hung on the wall (poster
and board), or in the subject’s pocket (smartphone). The person
who communicates with the subject is in the same room.
In this scenerio, we used the Pupil headset as in the previous
study. The image-arrangement scheme was investigated in this
setting. We built a web-based interface to simulate a touch
screen because it decreased the entry time and improved the
usability (see Section IV-A). The web application could be
accessed from desktop computers or mobile devices.
To assess the users’ effort, we asked each subject to answer
a sequence of different image-based passwords. To make the
authentication scheme more secure, a new password is gener-
ated whenever the user forms a wrong sequence of images in
the chronological order. The statistical number of attempts and
entry time are showed in Figure 11 for the first four passwords.
There is a declining trend in both Figure 11a and Figure 11b
indicates that the user can learn about the occurrence order of
images after solving a couple of passwords. Our experimental
participants spent in average 12.62 seconds to answer the
first authentication challenge. When all four passwords were
taken into account, each subject spent 9.77 seconds with 1.21
attempts to solve a password. The duration is comparable with
other graphical password schemes such as PassApp [7] 7.27
seconds, Passfaces [8] 18.25 seconds, and De´ja` Vu [9] 27 -
32 seconds. In addition, our proposed scheme exposes a new
password if the previous attempt results in a wrong temporal
sequence of images.
C. Daily Condition Study
To evaluate our system in the long-term context, we anal-
ysed two scenarios in which the subjects wore the cameras
for several days and answered the authentication challenges.
In this study, we focus on the image-selection authentication
scheme. A similar experiment had been deployed with the
image-arrangement scheme in the latter part of Section IV-A.
In the first case, the Transcend DriveProTM Body 10 camera
were worn by a graduate student in three weeks (cf. Fig-
ure 10b). Mainly, the videos contain scenes of home, work-
place, and navigation (both on foot and on public transport).
The subject even captured videos of a trip to Stockholm
(Sweden), Wadern (Germany), and Brussels (Belgium), where
the student visited for the first time. The subject performed
the log-in actions multiple times during the experiment with
dynamically-generated graphical passwords.
(a) Average number of attempts to solve each password (b) Average entry time spent on solving each graphical password
Fig. 11. User effort in terms of the number of attempts and the entry time in the object-interaction scenario with image-arrangement authentication challenges.
The prototype supports slide-and-swipe interaction to decrease the entry time.
(a) Number of clicks to solve the passwords
(b) Time duration spent on solving the passwords
Fig. 12. User effort in terms of the number of clicks and the entry time
(duration) in the daily condition study with image-selection authentication
challenges
Another web-based prototype was implemented that dis-
plays from two to eight photos. They came from videos
recorded in two consecutive days. The subject was required
to pick the valid images describing events in the previous day
but not in the current day. Our system randomized both the
total number of images n and the quantity of valid photos
k and did not let the user know those parameters. In a
password containing n images (i.e. password lengh is n),
there must be 1 ≤ k ≤ (n − 1) valid ones. The user may
select and unselect an image multiple time until achieving the
correct configuration. In the web application, clicking on an
image alternates its state. We recorded the number of clicks
instead of the number of attempts. The entry time is calculated
Correctness > 50% > 75% 100%
Entry time (seconds) 3.77 (2.88) 4.85 (3.08) 5.66 (3.33)
# clicks 2.09 (0.98) 3.14 (1.68) 3.68 (2.08)
TABLE II
THE AVERAGE ENTRY TIME IN SECONDS AND NUMBER OF CLICKS TO
ACHIEVE PARTIAL AND TOTAL CORRECTNESS IN THE image-selection
SCHEME. THE NUMBERS IN BRACKETS ARE STANDARD DEVIATION.
from when the password fully appears until when the proper
selection is reached.
Regardless of password length and number of valid images,
the user consumes 3.10 seconds to click 5.14 times on the
images on average. Figure 12 reveals the relationship between
the password configuration, i.e. length and number of valid
images (n, k), and the user’s effort. Apparently, the number
of clicks and the entry time increase when the password
becomes complex. In the experimental results, 50% of the two-
image passwords were solved in about 1 second or less with a
single click. It makes this password length a suitable candidate
for quick unlocking a mobile device. In order to investigate
the most secure configuration (i.e. eight-image passwords),
we adjust the system in such a way that it yields longer
authentication challenges (approximately 50% of passwords
contain eight photos). Even though these are challenging, the
user solved them on average 4.78 seconds (cf. Figure 12a)
with 7.44 clicks (cf. Figure 12b).
Furthermore, as an effort to improve the usability, we in-
vestigated another daily condition case involving four subjects
(two females, two with glasses). Each of them wore the
camera in two consecutive days. Then, they tried to solve
the image-selection authentication challenges whenever they
wanted. If we consider the password length 2 − 8 images
with 1− 7 valid images, the mean entry time is 4.67 seconds
(standard deviation 3.17) and the mean number of clicks is
2.92 (standard deviation 1.89). Nevertheless, in this case, we
studied only the eight-image passwords because they had a
balanced ratio of valid and invalid images. When the users
answered the challenges, we quantified the correctness of the
current solution based on the number and position of chosen
valid photos. Table II shows the user effort in terms of the
average entry time (seconds) and number of clicks to achieve
answers 50%, 75%, and 100% of similarity comparing with
the correct image-based authentication challenges. Based on
the observation, the users can be allowed to configure our
system as a trade-off between security and usability, e.g. an
input can be considered as valid if it has 75% of similarity
with the correct passwords. We consider this technique as an
approach to reduce the entry time and the number of clicks.
V. THREAT MODEL
In contrast to other image-based authentication schemes
where images are selected from a fixed collection [9] [8], our
photo collection comes from ever-changing egocentric videos.
Therefore, our approach is resistant to smudge attacks and
shoulder surfing. It is further not possible to steal the password
from the user (as it is, for instance, with biometric-based
schemes), since the authentication challenge is never the same
and, in particular, the user is not aware of the authentication
challenge ahead of time. This enrollment phase proceeds
implicitly without the user’s intervention. Thus, generally
speaking, the entropy of the graphical password space depends
on the user’s personal activities, i.e. contextual information. If
few different activities are conducted, the complexity of the
authentication challenges generated degenerates as variation
is low. In such case (when very similar image features are
observed), we suggest that either the history considered for
password generation is extended, or fallback authentication is
used. This is useful also to reduce frustration for the legitimate
user as we have observed in our experiments a tendency that
low-variance behaviour might occasionally result in difficult
to solve authentication challenges in which the exact order of
similar and spatially close activities is hard to recall.
A natural threat for our authentication scheme is an ad-
versary following the user, remembering visual context, and
bringing the locked device in her possession. To successfully
answer the image-based passwords, she or he is then required
to know thoroughly the user’s actions and positions. While this
is possible, we remark that it is difficult to achieve undetected,
especially for a stranger, because the user may spend time in
a personal space (e.g. a private office). We remark that this
issue has been addressed also by Shiraga et al. in [37]. The
authors deployed two cameras on a back-pack to capture what
happens behind the wearer when walking. Furthermore, even
if the adversary obtains knowledge on the daily routine of the
user, it is still challenging to guess the generated passwords
without tracking the user suspiciously. We have investigated
these cases in a user study (see the box below).
Another case is that the adversary has both the eyeglasses
and the locked device in her possession for a duration which
is long enough to generate an authentication challenge. In
this case, the image-generated authentication challenges would
pose no protection. However, we suggest that the protocol
is implemented together with a framework to verify the
eyeglasses wearer (cf. figure 2), so that the different user
would be detected. We therefore believe that this threat is
easily mitigated for our system.
Informed attackers: In the object-interaction scenario (see
Section IV-B), we conducted an attack in which the adver-
saries (2 attackers) had good knowledge on the environment
(including locations of the furniture and suggested activi-
ties) and tried to solve others’ authentication challenges.
These attackers reported that they leveraged two strategies
to obtain the correct temporal order of images: (1) leverag-
ing their knowledge on the suggested activities and the fur-
niture arrangement to form a candidate image order, and (2)
fixing an arrangement for every graphical password without
paying attention to the images. If they could not determine
any answer, they tended to choose a random one. The mean
time spended on a single challenge was 54.91 seconds
(standard deviation 67.04) with average 10.72 attempts
(standard deviation 10.91) for utilizing random patterns. In
case of the second strategy, each image-based password
took the attacker 64 seconds (standard deviation 56.12)
with 22.36 attempts (standard deviation 20.82) on average.
Even though occasionally the attackers randomly selected
the correct order, their effort was much higher than that of
a legitimate user. Hence, thresholds can be set on the user’s
effort (e.g. limits on entry time and number of attempts) to
issue other authentication schemes (e.g. security questions)
or lock the personal devices permanently.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a novel user authentication mechanism
which takes advantage of egocentric videos recorded by wear-
able cameras. We explain how to select video frames that
are possible to discriminate in the timeline. Those chosen
images contain visual details that are meaningful to the users.
Two visual descriptors, CENTRIST [35] and PHOG [36],
are aggregated to characterize an photo. We explain the
selection criteria and implement the algorithm which is based
on image segmentation and clustering techniques. They are
organized into two graphical password schemes in different
time scales: image-arrangement and image-selection. In order
to authenticate in the first scheme, an image sequence must
be arranged into their chronological order. In this case, the
chosen images belong to short and instant activities rather
than daily routines. The second scheme leverages human
memory on when specific events occur. To log-in, users are
required to identify which scenes have not appeared or which
activities have not happened at a certain moment. To evaluate
our proposed approach, the user study is performed in three
settings, including daily activities, object-interaction actions,
and traveling scenarios:
• The image-arrangment scheme has the average entry time
of 9.77 seconds in the object-interaction scenario and 9.79
seconds in two-day experiments
• The image-selection scheme achieves the average entry
time of 3.10 seconds in a three-week study and 4.67
seconds in two-day experiments
The experimental results show that the temporary and context-
based graphical passwords are usable and compatible with
touch-based interfaces.
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